What is rear encryption?

Talking about backgrounds in encrypted services, then again, the tours after that Reports appeared The UK government seeks to force Apple to open up E2EE’s ICLIE TV Display Backup. Officials are said to be Apple to create the “back door” in the service that would allow government actors to clearly access data.

The United Kingdom has comprehensive powers to reduce the use of technology companies for strong encryption since the pass 2016 Update of government monitoring authorities. According to reports before Washington PostUK officials used the IPA App for Apple-searching for “blanket” access to data that is designed by iCloud Advanced Data Protectation (ADP) to protect from access to third party, including Apple itself.

APLEP technical engineering from APPLE service is designed in a way that is not kept to the technology giant, encryption key – thanks to the use of Checks from end to end (E2e) – Allow the Apple to promote that it has “zero knowledge” of its user data.

A rear door It is a term that is usually published to describe a secret security vulnerability that is inserted into a symbol of fraud, undermining or undermining security measures in order to enable third parties. In the iCloud case, the request allows UK intelligence agents or law to access the encrypted data for users.

While the UK government routinely refuses to confirm or reject notifications reports issued under IPA, security experts warned that this is a secret matter It can have global repercussions If the iPhone maker is forced to weaken the safety protection he provides to all users, including those outside the United Kingdom.

Once there is a security vulnerability in the programs, there is a risk of being exploited by other types of agents, says infiltrators and other bad actors who want to reach necklace – such as stealing identity, or get even to spread ransom programs.

This may explain that the prevailing formulation used about attempts by the state to reach E2e is the visual abstraction of the rear paper; to request They are He is intentionally In addition to the code makes the bars clear.

To use an example: when it comes to physical doors – in buildings, walls, or the like – it never guarantees that the owner of the property or the owner of the key only has an exclusive use of this entry point.

Once there is an opening, it creates the possibility to reach – a person can get a copy of the key, for example, or even imposes its way by breaking the door.

The bottom line: There is no completely selective entrance to allow a specific person to pass. If someone can enter, this is logically following that someone else is able to use the door as well.

The principle of the risk of access itself applies to the weaknesses added to the programs (or in reality, devices).

concept Nobus (“No one of us”) Backdoors has been launched by security services in the past. This specific type of rear door usually depends on an assessment of its technical capabilities to exploit a specific security vulnerability than to be superior to all others-a more apparently stable basis that cannot be accessed exclusively by their agents.

But through nature, the ingenuity of technology and ability is a moving achievement. The evaluation of the technical capabilities of others unknown is also an accurate science. The concept of “Nobus” sits on already doubtful assumptions; Any third party arrival creates the risk of opening new attacks for the attack, such as social engineering techniques that aim to target the person through “accredited” access.

It is not surprising, that many security experts reject Nubos as mainly defective idea. Simply, any access that creates risks; Therefore, the pressure on the background is anti -security.

However, regardless of these clear and current security concerns, Governments continue to click on the background. This is why we continue to talk about them.

The term “Backdooor” also indicates that such requests can be secret, not general-and there are no entry points for the public. In the case of Apple iCloud, it is not possible to legally unveil the request for coding under IPA in the United Kingdom – by “notifying the technical ability” or TCN – by the recipient. The intention of the law is that any of this secret is confidential according to the design. (TCN’s leakage to the press is one of the mechanisms to circumvent the information block, but it is important to note that Apple has not yet made any general comment on these reports.)

According to the rights group Electronic Borders CorporationThe term “Backdoo” dates back to the eighties, when Backdooor (and “Trapdoo”) was used to refer to secret accounts and/or passwords created to allow an unknown person to reach a system. But over the years, the word has been used to name a wide range of attempts to decompose or circumvent data safety or adhere to it by encryption.

While Backdoors is in the news again, thanks to the UK that chases the backup of the ICLOD encrypted from Apple, it is important to realize that data access requirements belong to contracts.

Once again in the 1990s, for example, the US National Security Agency (NSA) developed encrypted devices to process the sound messages and the data that had been baked – with the aim of allowing security services to intercept encrypted communications. The “Clipper Chip”, as well as a system of the main warranty – used to create an encryption key and store it by government agencies in order to facilitate access to encrypted data if the state authorities want to.

NSA’s attempt to skin chips with baked backgrounds has failed due to a lack of adoption in the wake of a violent security and privacy reaction. Although the Clipper chip is due to help in launching the efforts of encryption specialists to develop and deploy strong encryption programs in an attempt to secure data against the abuse of the intruding government.

The Clipper chip is also a good example of the place where access to the system was publicly done. It should be noted that the background should not be always secret. (In the case of iCloud in the United Kingdom, state agents clearly wanted to reach without Apple’s knowledge of this.)

Add to this, often emotional advertising governments about the demands of access to data in an attempt to form general support and/or pressure on service providers to comply – such as saying that access to E2e is necessary to combat child abuse, terrorism, or prevent some crime Other hideous.

The rear back can have a way to return to the bite of creators. For example, Broked infiltrators in China They were behind the compromise of the federal open eavesdropping systems Last fall -It is clear that access to the data of American telecommunications companies and Internet specifications thanks to the 30 -year -old federal law that imposed access to rear paper (albeit, in this case, for non -e2e data), which confirms the risk of baking blankets deliberately arrival points To the systems.

Governments should also worry about creating foreign backgrounds that risk their citizens and national security.

There have been multiple cases of Chinese devices and programs that are suspected of housing rear devices over the years. Fears related to the potential risks of the rear paper have led some countries, Including the United KingdomTo take steps to remove or limit the use of Chinese technical products, such as the ingredients used in the infrastructure of critical communications, in recent years. Fears of the background can also be a strong incentive.